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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, t Case No. 860063 
-v- : 
DOUGLAS CARTER, : Category No. 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
IHIBQDUC1IQN. 
The State files this response to the amicus curiae 
brief submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 
Although the ACLU raises issues not raised or addressed by the 
parties, the State will assume for purposes of its response that 
the ACLU's arguments are properly before the Court and will be 
ruled on in this appeal. Cf» 2taifi_Xx_Tilln)aDf 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6, 7-8, P.2d , (1987) (discussing scope of appellate 
review in death penalty cases); SJtatfi_Y.A_kaffgr.ty., No. 20740 
(Utah Jan. 11, 1988). 
_BG_M£_I 
E__HX__ 
THE ERRONEOUS GUILT PHASE INSTRUCTION ON A 
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE DOES NOT 
REQUIRE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION; 
NOR DOES IT NECESSARILY RENDER DEFENDANT'S 
DEATH SENTENCE INVALID. 
The ACLU correctly notes that the jury instruction on 
the aggravating circumstance set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-
202(1)(q) (Supp. 1987),x which was given at the guilt phase of 
defendant's trial (Instruction No. 6; R. 141), did not include 
critical statutory language that defines and narrows the terms 
•especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved 
manner11 by limiting their application to situations involving 
"physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury of the victim before death." This clearly was error and 
invalidates the jury's reliance on the subsection (1)(q) 
circumstance at guilt phase. However, as the ACLU concedes, this 
instructional error does not require reversal of defendant's 
first degree murder conviction, in that the jury, in addition to 
finding the subsection (1)(q) circumstance, specifically found 
the statutory aggravated burglary circumstance under S 76-5-
202(1) (d) (see "Special Verdict" at R. 185-86) which by itself 
was sufficient to support the conviction. ££a££-Xj...2fibDSQDr 740 
P.2d 1264, 1268 (Utah 1987); S£at£-X*-Sb3ff£I# 725 P.2d 1301, 
1307 (Utah 1986). The real issue, and admittedly a difficult 
one, is whether the guilt phase instructional error requires 
Section 76-5-202(1)(q) provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(q) The homicide was committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner, any of which 
must be demonstrated by physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury of the victim before death. 
-2-
vacation of the death sentence imposed by the jury in a separate 
penalty hearing* 
The ACLU argues that, given the evidence presented at 
guilt phase, it is unclear whether the jury would have found the 
(1)(q) circumstance had it been properly instructed. It then 
concludes that the uncertainty as to a (1)(q) finding necessarily 
invalidates defendant's death sentence because in the penalty 
phase the jury might have weighed the (1)(q) factor differently, 
or perhaps not at all (assuming that the circumstance was not 
found at guilt phase), had it been properly instructed. After a 
discussion of the relevant case law, the ACLU urges the Court to 
adopt the view that if an invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstance was part of the weighing process conducted by the 
sentencer, remand of the case to the trial court for a new 
sentencing hearing is the only appropriate remedy; a harmless 
error analysis by this Court should not be undertaken. 
The State agrees that it is not entirely clear the jury 
would have found the (1)(q) circumstance at guilt phase had it 
been properly instructed. However, in arguing for an automatic 
sentencing remand rule, the ACLU fails to discuss a critical case 
in this Court's capital murder jurisprudence—Andrews v. Morris* 
677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983). There, the Court fully discussed the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862 (1983), and Barclay v. Florida. 463 U.S. 939 (1983), and 
concluded that it was harmless error not to have given a gtate v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), ££XJt. tailed # 459 U.S. 988 (1982), 
reasonable doubt instruction at the penalty phase of the 
-3-
petitioners1 capital murder trial. 677 P.2d at 95-96. It 
stated: 
The entire record of petitioners1 original 
trial is before us in connection with these 
petitions. We are familiar with all of the 
facts concerning their crimes and all of the 
evidence submitted at their sentencing 
hearing. We are able, on the basis of our 
examination of that evidencef to conclude 
with complete confidence that the use of the 
tfQQd standard in the penalty phase "could not 
possibly affect the balance." There can be 
no reasonable doubt that, in petitioners1 
circumstances, the totality of the 
aggravating factors outweighed the totality 
of the mitigating factors and the imposition 
of the penalty was appropriate. 
Id., at 96 (footnote omitted). Thus, it is clear from &ndtews 
that the instructional error in the instant case is subject to a 
harmless error analysis. The ACLU offers no direct criticism of 
this Court's decision to apply such an analysis in &ndl£WS* 
Accordingly, the narrow issue before the Court is whether the 
failure to properly instruct the jury at guilt phase on the 
(1)(q) circumstance in defendant's case was harmless error 
insofar as the penalty phase decision is concerned. 
Because this Court relied heavily on ZaDt and Barclay 
in adopting the harmless error rule for capital cases, those 
decisions are usefully applied to the issue presented here. In 
ZaQJt* the question was whether a death sentence could be upheld 
under Georgia law where one of the three statutory aggravating 
circumstances relied on by the jury in imposing the death penalty 
was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court observed that: 
The answer depends on the function of the 
jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance 
under Georgia's capital sentencing statute, 
and on the reasons that the aggravating 
-4-
circumstance at issue in this particular case 
was found to be invalid. 
462 U.S. at 864. It then went on to hold that the two valid 
statutory aggravating factors found by the jury performed the 
constitutionally required function of "genuinely narrow!ing] the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . 
reasonably justify!ing] the imposition of a more severe sentence 
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder," and 
that the death sentence was not impaired by the jury instruction 
regarding the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance. Id»# 
at 877, 878-79, 887-89. On this last point, the Court, having 
observed that the underlying evidence presented in support of the 
invalidated aggravating circumstance was nevertheless admissible 
under Georgia law at the sentencing hearing, stated: 
The effect the erroneous instruction may 
have had on the jury is therefore merely a 
consequence of the statutory label 
"aggravating circumstance." That label 
arguably might have caused the jury to give 
somewhat greater weight to respondents prior 
criminal record than it otherwise would have 
given. But we do not think the Georgia 
Supreme Court erred in its conclusion that 
the "mere fact that some of the aggravating 
circumstances presented were improperly 
designated •statutory1" had "an 
inconsequential impact on the jury's decision 
regarding the death penalty." 250 Ga., at 
100, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. The instructions, 
see supca, at 866, did not place particular 
emphasis on the role of statutory aggravating 
circumstances in the jury's ultimate 
decision. Instead the trial court instructed 
the jury to "consider all of the evidence 
received in court throughout the trial before 
you" and to "consider all facts and 
circumstances presented in extinuation Isic], 
mitigation and aggravation of punishment as 
well as such arguments as have been presented 
for the State and for the Defense." App. 18. 
More importantly, for the reasons discussed 
-5-
above, any possible impact cannot fairly be 
regarded as a constitutional defect in the 
sentencing process. 
Id., at 888-889 (footnote omitted). In short, "Iwlhat is 
important . . . is an individualized determination on the basis 
of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the 
crime." Id,. at 879 (emphasis in original). Although the 
unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance was considered 
by the jury in Zant. this basic principle for capital sentencing 
was not frustrated. 
Barclay involved reliance by the sentencing judge in a 
capital case on an aggravating circumstance which was not 
designated for consideration by Florida's capital sentencing 
statute.^ As stated by the Supreme Court: 
The crux of the issue . . . is whether the 
trial judge's consideration of this improper 
aggravating circumstance so infects the 
1
 In Barclay, the Court noted: 
ITlhe Florida statute, like the Georgia 
statute at issue in Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U#S. 862, (1983), requires the sentencer to 
find at least one valid statutory aggravating 
circumstance before the death penalty may 
even be considered, and permits the trial 
court to admit any evidence that may be 
relevant to the proper sentence. Unlike the 
Georgia statute, however, Florida law 
requires the sentencer to balance statutory 
aggravating circumstances against all 
mitigating circumstances and does not permit 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to 
enter into this weighing process. E.g.. 
Mikenas v. State, 367 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1978). 
The statute does not establish any special 
standard for this weighing process. 
463 U.S. at 954 (footnote omitted). 
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balancing process created by the Florida 
statute that it is constitutionally 
impermissible for the Florida Supreme Court 
to let the sentence stand. . . . 
463 U.S. at 9C»6, The Court upheld the Flori da Si apreme Cour t's 
application of its harmless error analysis to Barclay's case, 
observing th.,;it " 1 i l m why the Florida Supreme 
Court cannot examine the balance struck by the trial judge and 
decide that the elimination of improperly considered aggravating 
circumstances coul d n o t p o s s I b 1 y a £ £ e c t: I: I: i e b a 1 a i i c e , " 4 6 3 U . S . 
at 95 8. 
In utah # to convict a defendant i first degree murder, 
the fact finder must find that th-.~ . - , - ent i onal or 
-* ..*;:.j billing under one * ir.i* several statutori ly 
i . .• 1 * r stances. UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-5-202 
(Supp. . * * presence f thp aggravating circumstance(s) 
distinguishes first degree murder from second degree murder under 
UTAH COOL ANN §> 76-5-20 3 ! I I ( a ) (f.upj 1 9 8 7 ) . See State . 
Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . By incorporating specific 
aggravating circumstances into the definition first degree 
murder
 f an initial nai r ow i ny of tin: pool of c--4 - riants eligible 
for the death penalty occurs in the guilt phase. State v. 
XillmAIIr 72 Utah Adv. Rep, at J 8. See also Andrews v. Shulsen, 
80 2 F.2d 12 56, 126 2 (lot! : Cir 1 9 % ) , UZLLL- pending, A fur ther 
narrowing occurs at penalty phase where the jury has before it 
information regard,-, m u i v i d u a l characteristics of the 
defendant and his offense, "including but not limited to ti :ie 
nature and circumstances of the crime f the defendant's character# 
back g r o u 11 d t his 11 • iy , me n t a J a r i d phy sIca J co n d i t i on, and any other 
- 7 -
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty." UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1987). At the penalty hearing, 
aggravating circumstances include, but are not limited to, those 
proved in the guilt phase, and mitigating circumstances must 
include, but are not limited to, those designated in S 76-3-
207(2)(a)-(g). Ibid. Sfifi dlSfi &ndt£HS-X*-£bulS£Dr 802 F.2d at 
1262-63. The sentencer is then required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total 
mitigation and that the death penalty is appropriate before it 
can impose that penalty. Siat£_Xj._HQQdr 648 P.2d at 81. Neither 
the sentencing statute nor the relevant case law requires the 
sentencer to assign any particular weight to the various 
statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Finally, the defendant sentenced to death 
receives automatic and "comprehensive review of the entire case, 
including a review of a sentence of death to determine if that 
sentence resulted from prejudice or arbitrary action or was 
disproportionate to the [crime]." S£at£_Yj.-.Ei£LE£# 572 P.2d 
1338, 1345 (Utah 1977), C£Ei* dfiDlfidf 439 U.S. 882 (1978). This 
appellate review includes consideration of prejudicial errors 
that were not preserved for appeal in the trial court or are 
neither assigned nor argued on appeal. S£at£-Yj.-IilllDaD# 72 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 7-8; ££a££_Xi._Lfl£f£l£X# No. 20740, slip op. at 23 
(Utah Jan. 11, 1988). It is against this backdrop and the 
harmless error analysis set forth in &DdC£W5-3£j.-tJfittiS that the 
ACLU's argument must be considered. 
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Despite the instructional e n o i leyaiding tin1 (]J|\JI 
circumstance,, the ji lry properly performed its initial narrowing 
function at gi lilt phase by finding that defendant committed an 
intentional or knowing k ill ing wh ile in t he comm I s s i on of , : »r an 
attempt to commitf ai 1 aggravated burglary (R. 185). See § 76-5-
20 2(1) |d) rhe questioi i tl len is whether presentation of the 
(1) (q) circumstance at penalty phase r along with t.ln." other 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances* so infected the 
b a ] a n c i n g p r o c e s s t i: i a f 11: i i s C o u r t should not alinw defendant's 
death sentence tc » stand. See Ba££lax# 4b.! U.S. at 956; IUJJLUWS 
JU-BQIliSt 6 7 7 P. 2d at 96. 
F i i: s t
 r t ! i e e v i d e i i c e p i e s i»r 11 e 11 in s u p p o r t of t h e I i ) (q) 
factor was independently admissible at the sentencing hearing as 
evidence relating to "the nature and circumstances of the crime.," 
S 76-3-207 121* Jgyu S t a t e - Y i ^ X l l l m a D # 72 Utah Adv. Rep., at , "i 
("evidence of past criminal c o n v i c t i o n s is clearly within the 
scope of the statutory reference to "the defendants character, 
background, [and] history 1")* Thur , as in JyjGti admission of the 
underlying evidence did not offend any statutory or 
constitut ionaJ provisi on» 
Second, the penalty phase instructions to the jui > did 
not place any emphasis on the statutory aggravating circumstances 
oi: r equI i:e 11 :ie j ury to gIve them special weight. The 
instructions read ii i pertinent part: 
You have previously found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree in this 
case. It is therefore improper for you to 
again debate or reconsider the question of 
""'• defendant's guilt or innocence of that 
offense. 
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The deliberations in the sentencing phase 
are significantly different from those you 
were engaged in in the guilt phase. In the 
sentencing phase you will need to consider 
more than the defendant's particular acts* 
You must take into consideration the 
particulars of the offense with the character 
and propensities of the offender, together 
with other factors as hereinafter outlined 
for you. 
The law provides that evidence may be 
presented to you as to any matter the Court 
deems relevant to the sentence, including but 
not limited to the nature and circumstances 
of the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty. The state's 
attorneys, the defendant's attorneys and the 
defendant are and will be permitted to 
present evidence and arguments for or against 
the sentence of death. 
In reaching your verdict you may consider 
all of the facts and circumstances, if you 
find there be any, in mitigation of 
punishment. In determining whether 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist 
you may consider all of the evidence produced 
either by the state or the defendant 
throughout the guilt phase or penalty phase 
of the trial. 
Mitigating circumstances may include 
circumstances which do not constitute 
justification or excuse for the crime but 
which may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the moral culpability or blame. 
The burden of proof necessary for a 
verdict of death over life imprisonment in 
this case is on the state and after 
considering the totality of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, not in terms of 
the relative numbers of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, but in terms of their 
respective substantiveness and 
persuasiveness, you must be persuaded beyond 
a reasonable doubt that total aggravation 
outweight (sic] total mitigation, and you 
•10-
must further be persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the imposition of the death 
penalty is justified and appropriate in this 
case. In meeting this burden, the state does 
not have to show that there is an absence of 
mitigating circumstances. 
The Jury is instructed that It can consider 
as aggravating circumstances the very matters 
which were aggravating circumstances in the 
guilt phase, specifically that the defendant 
committed the murder of Eva Oleson during the 
commission of or an attempt to commit 
aggravated burglary and that the murder was 
committed in an especially heinous, atrocious 
and cruel manner. 
You may consider as aggravating 
circumstances the nature and circumstances of 
the crime and any other facts in aggravation 
produced that relate to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime or the individual 
character of the defendant. 
With respect to mitigating circumstances, 
the law provides that you may consider the 
following: 
1. The defendant has no significant 
history of prior criminal activity. 
2. The murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
At the time of the murder, the 
capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirement of law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs. 
4. The youth of tin1 defendant .i, I t h,i« 
time of the crime. 
5. And any other fact in nufiyation of 
the penalty. 
However, the mitigating circumstances 
which I have read for your consideration are 
given to you ro.ere.ly as examples of some of 
the factors that you may take into account as 
reasons for deciding not to impose a death 
-11 -
sentence upon Mr. Carter* You should pay 
careful attention to each of such factors* 
Any one of them may be sifficient [sic), 
standing alone, if the state fails to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances and to support a decision that 
death is not the appropriate punishment in 
this case. But you should not limit your 
consideration of mitigating circumstances to 
these specific factors. You may also 
consider any other circumstances (relating to 
the case or to the defendant, Mr. Carter), as 
reasons for not imposing the death sentence. 
(R. 178-82)• These instructions clearly instructed the jury that 
its role as sentencer was very different from the role it played 
at guilt phase. In determining what penalty to impose, the jury 
was to weigh all the evidence of aggravation and mitigation; the 
instructions were neutral on the question of what weight is to be 
assigned to each factor. Thusf as in ZaD£# although the 
instructions label one of the aggravating circumstances as 
statutory when, given the instructional error at guilt phase, it 
was not clear that that statutory aggravating circumstance was 
present, the death sentence is sustainable because the evidence 
supporting the improperly identified factor was admissible as 
relevant to the nature and circumstances of defendant's crime. 
This Court, in its independent review, could reasonably conclude 
that the instructions' improper identification of an aggravating 
circumstance as the statutory aggravating circumstance set forth 
in S 76-5-202(1)(q) did not so infect the balancing process that 
the jury's death verdict must be set aside. See 2an£* 462 U.S. 
at 888-89; BatClaYr 463 U.S. at 958; &DdLfiHS-YjL-Mfii:iiSf 677 P.2d 
at 96. 
•12-
The St .at .e concedes that, as pointed out by the ACLU, 
the prosecutor's closing arguments at guilt phase and penalty 
phase emphasized the evidence he thought supported a (1) (-|, 
£ ind i ng » Pei:t iaps soine o£ tha t ev i <ien< :e ai i< 3 poi: tions o £ the 
prosecutor's arguments concerning if were inconsistent with the 
statutory definition of "especially heinous f atrocious, cruel, or 
e x c e p 1 1 oi ia 1 1 }< depi: av e d roai Ii ne r • " 11 o w e v fj i
 r t h e ev i d e n e e a n :3 
arguments were proper as relating to I he natuie and circumstances 
i > - : . rr.- which may t • considered by the sentencer under 
1 ;..-,. u c l o L i n y a r g u m e n t at p e n a l t y 
phase, the 11 ^ secutor did not suggest to the jury that the 
sta*..*.-,. a. . avatiny circumstances it had found at guilt phase 
carried ai ly greater weight simply because they were staiUtfity 
aggravating factors. Rather, his argument keyed In to the method 
\ - -- i •• stances i :ti ider w h i cl: :;t It occurred* 
la: - adjectives "heinous and cruel and atrocious" in 
making his argument concerning the ext .ent of aggravation did not 
n o c e s s a i iJy i,i« t v t in e m p h a s i z e a v.t a t nt nr y <j>jut f-n'd t irnj f a c t o r 
that was not properly before the jury; he could have properly 
used those terms to describe his view of the method by which 
defendant killed his victim. And, because "lilt is entiiely 
fitting for the moral r factual, and legal judgment of judges and 
juries to p] ay a meaningful role in sentencing," Ifliclay* 46 3 
U.S. at 950# t .he jury was free to assess and weigh that evidence 
as it saw fit in determining the appropriate sentence, Finallyf 
H I P pr o s e i u I oi (lull nut i v i
 lf colely on flip methoil of killing in 
arguing for a death sentence; he also pointed to defendant's 
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significant criminal history, the aggravated burglary that 
accompanied the killing, and the lack of any mitigating 
circumstances (R» 1432-41)• 
The two cases relied on most heavily by the ACLU— 
Cartwrioht v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987), and 
Collins v. Lockhart. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), ££JLt* ££Hi£sL, 474 
U.S. 1013 (1985)—are distinguishable from the instant case. In 
Cartwrioht* the Tenth Circuit held an Oklahoma death sentence 
invalid because one of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
considered by the sentencer was unconstitutional under the 
federal constitution. In holding that Zant was inapplicable to 
the case, the court specifically distinguished the function of an 
aggravating circumstance in the Oklahoma statute from the 
function an aggravating circumstance performs in other capital 
murder statutes like Utah's: 
The purpose of an aggravating circumstance 
in the Oklahoma statute is decidedly 
different from the purpose of an aggravating 
circumstance in the Georgia statute 
considered in Zant. An aggravating 
circumstance under the Oklahoma scheme does 
not establish a threshold that distinguishes 
capital murders from other first degree 
murders. In Oklahoma any first degree murder 
is punishable by life imprisonment or death. 
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, S 701.9 (West 1983). 
Therefore, the Oklahoma statute is unlike the 
statutes in those states in which aggravating 
circumstances are employed to narrow the 
class of first degree murderers that are 
eligible for the death penalty. See iaJXtr 
463 U.S. at 875, 103 S. Ct. at 2741 
(Georgia); Andrews, 802 F.2d at 1263 (Utah); 
Welcome Vt Blackburn, 793 F.2d 672, 677 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (Louisiana). ££. Johnson v. 
Thiopen, 806 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986), 
c e r t . d£jLi£il# U*S. , 107 S. C t . 1 6 1 8 , 
94 L.Ed.2d 802 (1987) ( M i s s i s s i p p i ) . 
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Oklahoma uses an aggravating circumstance 
to guide the discretion of the sentencer in 
determining whether the death penalty should 
be imposed for a particular murder. 
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, S 701.10 (West 1983). 
The sentencer must balance all of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances with all-
ot the mitigating circumstances. 
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21f S 701.11 (West 1983)• 
Zaot does not determine the effect of 
consideration of an unconstitutional 
statutory aggravating circumstance under the 
Oklahoma statute, for the Court in 2ant 
carefully observed that it did "not express 
any opinion concerning the possible 
significance of a holding that a particular 
aggravating circumstance is 'invalid1 under a 
statutory scheme in which the judge or jury 
is specifically instructed to weigh statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
exercising its discretion whether to impose 
the death penalty." 462 U.S. at 890, 103 S. 
Ct. at 2750; ggfi dlSS 13* at 873-74 n.l 2, 103 
S, Ct- at 27 41 n. 12. 
822 F.2d at 14 80. In contrast to Utah's scheme, Oklahoma law 
specifically requires the sentencer to weigh designated statutory 
aggrava11ng cIrcumstances against a 1 1 mitigating circumstances in 
determining penalty; the sentencer does not consider aggravating 
circumstances not designated by statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
2]
 r §§ 7 0] .10 701- J 2 (West 1 9 B 3 ) . 
This is the critical distinction between Oklahoma's 
statute and those like Utah's that the Tenth Circi lit focused on 
in concluding that Zaot w^- inapplicable, For the reasons 
discussed above, the Za^> harmless eir : analysis, which was 
adopt ed in ftuJu- . • „ W ": ' * appl icab] e to the 
instant case., CatJtWtigbi i £ nut inconsistent with that 
conclusion. 
CulliUii involved a situation qui iv different Iron that 
present here, In that case, the court held that it was error to 
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submit to the jury at penalty phase the aggravating circumstance 
that "the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain," when 
the defendant had been convicted at guilt phase of "the unlawful 
killing of a human being [. . . while] engaged in the 
perpetration of . . . robbery." Id* at 263. This practice has 
commonly been referred to as "double counting" or "doubling up" 
of an aggravating circumstance, ggg ColllDS* 754 F.2d at 264 
n.3; LgaiheitfQQd-yj.-5taJifif 435 So.2d 645, 648 (Miss. 1983), £gt£. 
dgDigdf 465 U.S. 1084 (1984). figg fllgQ LfitfgDfisld-lU-EbslPS, 817 
F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), £gt£. giflD£gd# 107 S. Ct. 3227. 
However, under the Arkansas statutes at issue in CfilliDS* "a 
finding of killing in the course of a listed felony was not 
itself sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death 
sentence!;] Itlhe jury also had to find at least one aggravating 
circumstance, and this circumstance had to be one of six listed 
in the statute § 41-4711," which contained as one alternative the 
"pecuniary gain" circumstance. Ibid* In other words, Collins 
was found guilty under the felony murder provision of Arkansas's 
first degree murder statute, which did not require proof of an 
intentional killing. As with all traditional felony murder 
statutes, a defendant is guilty of murder whether the killing was 
intentional or unintentional, so long as the killing was 
committed during the commission of an enumerated felony. See 
Statg.Yj—HflDSgDf 734 P.2d at 425 n.6, 426. Under the Arkansas 
scheme, the state had to then prove the aggravating circumstance 
of pecuniary gain in order to render Collins eligible for the 
death penalty. But, by using that particular circumstance to 
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a i j j i d v a t e tlitj tt«iuii> munieif I tin i . o i i i m . c o u r t b e l i e v e d (hat I he 
s t a t e had e f f e c t i v e l y c i r c u m v e n t e d the s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t of 
p r o v i n g an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e , s i n c e p e c u n i a r y ga in i s 
a lways an aspei t ol l u b b e i y ( the u n d e r l y i n g f e lon j for tl"ie f e l o n y 
murder c o n v i c t i o n ) , J'.>4 F,?d at 264, Thus, t h e s t a t u t o r y 
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e d i d n o t perform, i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
n e c e s s a r y f u n c t i o n of n a r r o w i n g t h e c l a n s of p o i s o n s e l i g i b l e fo r 
the d e a t h p e n a l t y . I b i d * ( c i t i n g QQd£tfiy-Xj.-Qfi2tgia# 446 U .S . 
420 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Z i l l t tepbfiQSf 462 U . S . 862 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ) . 
C l e a r l y , t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme in q u e s t i o n and t h e 
s p e c i f i c i s s u e s a d d r e s s e d in CfilliDS a r e d i s t i n c t from, t h o s e in 
t h i s c a s e , TI i e r e I: c > r c •
 r C S111 ill S i s n o t j : • a r t i c u 1 a r J y r e l e v a n t * 
EQIBX-II 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO DEFINE 
FURTHER THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE SET 
FORTH IN SECTION 76-5-202(1)(Q). 
The ACLU suggests that the Courtf in tht- context of 
tnis case, construe § 76-5-202(1)(q)• Beyond the question ol 
whether the language of subsection (] ) (q) is sufficiently 
specific and understandable so as not to require further judicial 
cons 11:Li.c t i oi :t, i t seen:ts c] eai: f r om the discussion in the preceding 
point of the role of the (1) (q) factor in this case that 
elaboration on the meaning of that factor is not necessari1 to the 
r e s o .1 i ;i t i o n c f d e f e n d a n t ! s a p p e a 1 • 
Because defendant's first degree murder conviction is 
sustainable without the (l)(q) circumstance, reconsideration of 
t h e c i i: c u in t t, a r i v e 1>} lite j u i > a I a n e w t r i a ] , w i t h o r w i t h o u t 
addi t ional d i r e c t i o n from the Cour t , i s unnecessary . See SJtatfi 
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XjL_&d£f£l£y§ slip op* at 34* And, because, as argued in the 
preceding point, the possible erroneous (1)(q) finding by the 
jury at guilt phase did not prejudice the penalty phase 
proceedings, a judicial interpretation of (1)(q) is similarly 
unnecessary for sentencing* Even if defendant's case were 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing, it would not be 
appropriate to ask the jury to reconsider the (1)(q) finding (the 
existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance being a guilt 
phase function only)• Given the improper instruction at guilt 
phase, presumably the jury would simply be instructed not to 
consider the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in 
redetermining sentence. 
EQIHX-22I 
THE ACLUfS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
ARGUMENT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS PREJUDICED BY COUNSELS ALLEGED ERRORS. 
The ACLU argues that defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at trial. Although it points to conduct by 
counsel that may raise questions concerning deficient 
performance, the ACLU fails to satisfy the demonstrable prejudice 
prong of the ineffectiveness test. In that regard, its argument 
i s more specu la t ive than subs tant ive . £g£ ££aifi«Xx-&IChillfitar 69 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16-17, P.2d , (1987). 
EQISI-IY 
THE ACLUfS SUGGESTION FOR ADDITIONAL 
INSTRUCTIONS IN A CAPITAL CASE IS ACCEPTABLE 
ONLY IN PART. 
The ACLU suggests that in a capital case the jury 
should be given two additional instructions: (1) a pretrial 
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instruction that informs the jury that "the fact that the case is 
potentially a capital case should in no way be regarded as 
suggesting the appropriateness of [the death] penalty,* and (2) 
"Iain instruction that the death penalty is an exceptional 
penalty for exceptional cases." Br. of Amicus at 39f 40-41. 
Assuming that the Court is inclined to address these 
suggested instructions (in that the ACLU does not argue that the 
absence of these instructions should result in the reversal of 
either defendant's conviction or his death sentence) , the State 
has no objection to the suggested pretrial instruction. However, 
an instruction to the jury at the sentencing hearing that the 
death penalty is an exceptional penalty reserved for exceptional 
cases is a misstatement of the law. It suggests that life 
imprisonment is the presumed sentence once a defendant is 
convicted of first degree murder, and that the State must rebut 
that presumption to obtain the death penalty. Under the relevant 
statutes, there is no presumption in favor of either a life 
sentence or a death sentence. Sfifi SS 76-3-206, - 207. All that 
is required is an accurate statement of the law that the State 
has the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that total 
aggravation outweighs total mitigation and that the death penalty 
is appropriate. Such an instruction was given in defendant's 
case (R. 180-81, 182). The jury was also correctly instructed 
that nonunanimity on a death sentence would result in a life 
sentence (R. 182-83). 
-19-
EQIBI-Y 
THE DEATH PENALTY IS AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE 
IN DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
The ACLU argues that defendant did not deserve the 
death penalty. However, that sentence is proportionate here for 
the same reasons it was in S£aifi_Xx_TilllDdD» 72 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
14. 
CQHCIUSIQB 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the ACLU's 
arguments for reversal of defendant's conviction and death 
sentence should be rejected. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of January, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
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' ' DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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